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SYSTEMIC RISK AND DODD-FRANK’S VOLCKER RULE 
JULIE A.D. MANASFI* 
ABSTRACT 
With the recent global financial crisis starting in 2007, the issue of 
“systemic risk” has attracted much attention in our financial system. 
Some legislators have asserted that proprietary trading by banking 
entities, generally the trading of financial instruments for a banking 
entity’s own account, played a critical role in the recent global financial 
crisis. These sentiments parallel arguments that the practices of banks and 
their securities affiliates in the 1920s were partly responsible for the stock 
market crash of 1929 and subsequent Great Depression. At the heart of 
these assertions is the issue of whether combining the businesses of com-
mercial banking and investment banking increases systemic risk. 
The Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act) contains provisions that 
prohibit commercial banks from underwriting, promoting, or selling secu-
rities directly or through an affiliated brokerage firm, effectively erecting 
a wall between commercial banking and investment banking. That wall 
was gradually weakened and picked apart over the course of the next sixty 
years or so, finally coming down with the Financial Services Modernization 
Act of 1999 (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act), which repealed the last remaining 
restrictions of the Glass-Steagall Act’s wall. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) of 2010 makes 
the most sweeping regulatory changes in this area since the 1930s by re-
erecting portions of Glass-Steagall’s wall. The Volcker rule, contained in 
the Dodd-Frank Act, restricts “banking entities” from engaging in pro-
prietary trading, and from sponsoring, or acquiring or retaining certain 
ownership interests in, a hedge or private equity fund. 
One of the policy justifications for these restrictions is that the pro-
hibited activities increase systemic risk. The implicit contentions in this 
justification are that if the prohibited activities are too risky they could 
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affect a bank’s liquidity, causing the banking entity to (i) be unwilling or 
unable to extend credit to qualified borrowers or (ii) to fail, disrupting 
credit channels. Similarly, some fear that banking entities may also fail 
from exposure to failing hedge or private equity funds, further disrupting 
credit channels. Are these implicit contentions underlying the Volcker 
rule’s enactment with respect to the policy rationale of systemic risk well 
founded? One way to attempt to answer that question is to look at whether 
the blending of commercial and investment banking really played a crit-
ical role in the recent recession and in the Great Depression, as some pro-
ponents of the Volcker rule and the Glass-Steagall Act contend. 
Parts I and II of this Article will provide the background necessary for 
a discussion of these questions. Part I will discuss the concept of systemic 
risk in general and describe the Volcker rule and its origins. Part II will 
describe the history of systemic risk banking regulation in the United 
States. Part III of this Article asks the important question of whether the 
blending of commercial banking and investment banking produces the 
alleged harm: increased systemic risk. The Article considers the argument 
that blending played a role in the stock market crash of 1929. It also 
considers the argument that blending played a role in the financial crisis 
of 2007. Part III concludes that the claims that the walls contained in the 
Glass-Steagall Act and Volcker rule are needed to decrease systemic risk 
have not been necessarily proven or statistically supported. It seems that 
the Glass-Steagall wall was erected in 1933 to address conflicts of interest 
in the blending and to serve as a purported fix to the horrors of the Great 
Depression in the name of regulating systemic risk—a wall erected for 
more political than economic reasons in satisfying public outcry to do 
something, anything, about the disaster. Eugene White’s bank failure sta-
tistics demonstrate not only that the blending may not increase systemic 
risk but that there may be diversification, complementaries, and economies 
of scope benefits to the blending. 
The policy justifications of the Glass-Steagall and Volcker rule walls 
must be detangled. If the conflicts of interest are the main harm we are 
trying to address, it may make sense to consider other solutions such as 
additional disclosures and regulations that protect the public from such 
conflicts. If, however, the harm we are trying to address is truly systemic 
risk, this Article posits that we need a better understanding of systemic risk 
in a modern era of financial innovation before we erect the Volcker rule 
wall that may decrease economies of scope, diversification of risks and per-
haps even global competitiveness. Perhaps doing something must wait for a 
better understanding of systemic risk and excessive risk-taking with respect 
to today’s financial innovation and instruments. Once there, the Article pos-
its that there must be some balancing of the synergies and global eco-
nomic advantages created from the blending and systemic risk concerns. 
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INTRODUCTION 
With the recent global financial crisis starting in 2007, the issue of 
“systemic risk” has been front and center in our political discourse.1 Some 
legislators have asserted that proprietary trading by banking entities, gener-
ally the trading of financial instruments for a banking entity’s own account, 
“played a critical role in the recent global financial crisis and subsequent 
recession.”2 These sentiments parallel arguments that the practices of 
banks and their securities affiliates in the 1920s jeopardized the soundness 
of banks and were partly responsible for the stock market crash of 1929 
and subsequent Great Depression.3 At the heart of these assertions is the 
issue of whether allowing banks to engage in the businesses of commercial 
banking and investment banking increases systemic risk.4 Commercial 
banking traditionally consists of making loans and taking deposits for the 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, 111TH CONG., SPEC. REP. ON REGULATORY 
REFORM: MODERNIZING THE AMERICAN FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM: RECOMMENDA-
TIONS FOR IMPROVING OVERSIGHT, PROTECTING CONSUMERS, AND ENSURING STABILITY, 
at 22–23 (2009); James Bullard, Christopher J. Neely & David C. Wheelock, Systemic 
Risk and the Financial Crisis: A Primer, 91 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 403, 407 
(2009); Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, U.S. Fed. Reserve, Speech at the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Kansas City’s Annual Economic Symposium: Reducing Systemic Management 
in Financial Institutions (Aug. 22, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov 
/newsevents/speech/bernanke20080822a.htm (stating the need to reduce systemic risk to 
promote and maintain stability in the financial system); Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, U.S. 
Fed. Reserve, Speech at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s Forum on Mortgage 
Lending for Low and Moderate Income Households: Financial Regulation and Financial 
Stability (July 8, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech 
/bernanke20080708a.htm (discussing instability in the financial system and the Federal 
Reserve’s analysis that “allowing Bear Stearns to fail ... would likely have had extremely 
adverse implications for the financial system”); Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, U.S. Fed. 
Reserve, Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago’s Annual Conference on Bank 
Structure and Competition: Risk Management in Financial Institutions (May 15, 2008), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/news events/speech/bernanke20080515a.htm 
(describing the origins of the current financial turmoil, including subprime mortgages and 
failures in management of risk by large financial institutions). 
2 Senator Jeff Merkley & Senator Carl Levin, Policy Essay, The Dodd-Frank Act 
Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Conflicts of Interest: New Tools to Address 
Evolving Threats, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 515, 515–16 (2011) [hereinafter Merkley & 
Levin]. For purposes of this Article, the term “proprietary trading” shall include the pur-
chase and sale of financial instruments for the banking entity’s own account and 
investment in private funds managed or sponsored by the banking entity. Id. at 515 n.1. 
3 Id. at 516–17; see also Eugene Nelson White, Before the Glass-Steagall Act: An 
Analysis of the Investment Banking Activities of National Banks, 23 EXPLORATIONS IN 
ECON. HIST. 33, 33 (1986) [hereinafter White, Before the Glass-Steagall Act]. 
4 Merkley & Levin, supra note 2, at 516–17. 
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net interest income.5 Investment banking generally consists of securities 
underwriting,6 dealing, trading, and other related activities7 for fee and 
commission income.8 
The Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act) contained provisions 
that prohibited commercial banks from engaging in investment banking 
directly or through an affiliated brokerage firm, effectively erecting a wall 
between commercial banking and investment banking.9 That wall was grad-
ually weakened and picked apart over the course of the next sixty years or 
so, finally coming down with the Financial Services Modernization Act of 
1999 (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act), which repealed the last remaining restric-
tions of the Glass-Steagall Act’s wall.10 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) of 2010 makes the most 
sweeping regulatory changes in this area since the 1930s by re-erecting por-
tions of Glass-Steagall’s wall.11 The Volcker rule, contained in the Dodd-
Frank Act, restricts “banking entities” from engaging in proprietary trading, 
and from sponsoring, or acquiring or retaining certain ownership interests 
in, a hedge or private equity fund.12 
                                                 
5 See ARTHUR O’SULLIVAN & STEVEN M. SHEFFRIN, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES IN 
ACTION 511, 513–14 (2003). 
6 The underwriting of securities issues involves guaranteeing a price at which the new 
equity or bond will sell. 
7 Other related activities include brokerage, financing services, and securities handling, 
for example. 
8 MICHEL FLEURIET, INVESTMENT BANKING EXPLAINED: AN INSIDER’S GUIDE TO THE 
INDUSTRY 42–43 (2008). 
9 See Banking (Glass-Steagall) Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, §§ 16, 20, 21, 32, 48 
Stat. 162, 184–85, 188–89, 194 (1933) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 227 (2012)). 
10 See Financial Services Modernization (Gramm-Leach-Blilely) Act of 1999, Pub. L. 
No. 106-102, § 101, 113 Stat. 1338, 1341 (1999). Section 101 repealed sections 20 and 32 
of the Glass-Steagall Act, which prohibited affiliations between commercial and invest-
ment banks. Id. Note that sections 16 and 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act, which prohibit 
what affiliates can do directly, are still in effect. 
11 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 619, 124 Stat. 1376, 1620–21 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012)). 
12 Id. “Banking entities” is “defined to include ... insured depository institutions, ... 
compan[ies] that control[] an insured depository institution or [companies] treated as a 
[Bank Holding Company] under the [Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA)], and any 
subsidiary or affiliate of those entities.” Understanding the New Financial Reform 
Legislation: The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, LEGAL 
UPDATE (Mayer Brown), July 2010, at 65 (July 2010) [hereinafter Understanding the 
New Financial Reform Legislation], available at http://www.mayerbrown.com/files 
/Publication/1ec275f4-5618-4a63-9d383129010c06db/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/e 
f42ecce-49ff-44b2-b37a-72b81d87fb79/Final-FSRE-Outlinev2.pdf. 
Thus, the prohibitions would apply to: FDIC-insured commercial 
banks, thrifts, and industrial loan companies (with an exception for 
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One of the policy justifications for these restrictions is that the prohib-
ited activities increase systemic risk.13 The implicit contentions in this jus-
tification are that if the prohibited activities are too risky they could affect 
a bank’s liquidity, causing the banking entity to be unable to extend credit 
to qualified borrowers or to fail, disrupting credit channels.14 Similarly, 
some individuals fear that banking entities may also fail from exposure to 
failing hedge or private equity funds, further disrupting credit channels.15 
Are these implicit contentions underlying the Volcker rule’s enactment 
with respect to the policy rationale of systemic risk well founded? One 
way to attempt to answer that question is to look at whether the blending 
of commercial and investment banking really played a critical role in the 
recent recession and in the Great Depression, as some proponents of the 
Volcker rule and the Glass-Steagall Act contend. Parts I and II of this Article 
will provide the background necessary for a discussion of these questions. 
Part I will discuss the concept of systemic risk in general and describe the 
Volcker rule and its origins. Part II will describe the relatively recent his-
tory of systemic risk banking regulation in the United States. 
Part III of this Article asks the important question of whether the blend-
ing of commercial banking and investment banking produces the alleged 
harm: increased systemic risk. The Article considers the argument that 
blending played a role in the stock market crash of 1929.16 It also considers 
the argument that blending played a role in the financial crisis of 2007.17 
                                                                                                                         
insured depository institutions that function solely in a trust or fiduciary 
capacity)...; any company that controls those depository institutions, 
regardless of the depository institution’s size; any non-U.S. bank (and 
any parent company) that has a US branch, agency, commercial lending 
company[,] or insured depository institution subsidiary; and any 
subsidiary of the foregoing entities. 
Id. at 66. 
13 See Merkley & Levin, supra note 2, at 538, 546. 
14 See JOHN KAMBHU, TIL SCHUERMANN & KEVIN J. STIROH, FED. RESERVE BANK OF 
N.Y., STAFF REPORT NO. 291, HEDGE FUNDS, FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION, AND SYSTEMIC 
RISK 11–12 (2007), http://www.ny.frb.org/research/staff_reports/sr291.pdf (discussing 
that collateralizing these exposures may not be sufficient to mitigate against this risk be-
cause collateral values may fall. However, recognizing that banks’ current exposures are 
heavily collateralized and each bank has some interest in mitigating these risks.). But see 
Anne Rivière, The Future of Hedge Fund Regulation: A Comparative Approach, 10 RICH. 
J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 263, 294 (2010) (discussing how the failure of Amaranth “did not 
have a destabilizing effect because counterparties to these funds held sufficient collateral”). 
15 See KAMBHU, SCHUERMANN & STIROH, supra note 14, at 13 (citing Hyun Song 
Shin, Risk and Liquidity in a System Context (BIS, Working Paper No. 212, 2006)). 
16 See discussion infra Part III.A. 
17 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
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Part III concludes that the claims that the walls contained in the Glass-
Steagall Act and Volcker rule are needed to decrease systemic risk have 
not been necessarily proven or statistically supported.18 It seems that the 
Glass-Steagall wall was erected in 1933 to address conflicts of interest in 
the blending and to serve as a purported fix to the horrors of the Great 
Depression in the name of regulating systemic risk19—a wall erected for 
more political than economic reasons in satisfying public outcry to do 
something, anything, about the disaster. Eugene White’s bank failure 
statistics demonstrate not only that the blending may not increase systemic 
risk, but that there may be diversification,20 complementaries,21 and eco-
nomies of scope benefits22 to the blending. The hearings and legislative 
history of both the Glass-Steagall Act and the Volcker rule emphasize the 
conflicts of interest with the blending as opposed to the systemic risk 
concerns.23 Conflicts of interest might include, for example, banks making 
loans on preferential terms to customers who purchase securities un-
derwritten by the bank, taking advantage of their knowledge of their 
clients’ investment activities, or taking advantage of their influence over 
their clients.24 
The policy justifications of the Glass-Steagall and Volcker rule walls 
must be detangled. If the conflicts of interest are the main harm we are 
trying to address, it may make sense to consider other solutions such as 
additional disclosures and regulations that protect the public from such 
conflicts. If, however, the harm we are trying to address is truly systemic 
risk, this Article posits that we need a better understanding of systemic 
risk in a modern era of financial innovation before we erect the Volcker 
                                                 
18 See discussion infra Part III. 
19 See S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 155–56 (1934). 
20 Diversification generally refers to reducing risk by investing in a variety of assets. 
O’SULLIVAN & SHEFFRIN, supra note 5, at 273–74. The idea is that a diversified portfolio 
will have less risk than the weighted average risk of its constituent assets. See id. 
21 Generally, for a good to be a complementary good, its demand increases when the 
price of another good decreases. Id. at 88. An example often given is that usually the 
demand for hot dog buns will increase when the price of hot dogs is decreased so hot dog 
buns and hot dogs are complementary goods. See id. (utilizing the example of skis and 
ski boots to explain complementary goods). 
22 Generally, “economies of scope” refers to the lowering average cost for a firm in 
producing two or more products. John C. Panzar & Robert D. Willig, Economies of Scope, 
71 AM. ECON. REV. 268, 268 (1981). There can also be synergies between products such 
that offering a complete range of products gives the consumer a more desirable product 
offering than a single product would. Id. 
23 See S. REP. NO. 73-1455, at 113–14, 155–56, 185–86, 351–52, 362, 393 (1934); 
Merkley & Levin, supra note 2, at 532–33, 539. 
24 Merkley & Levin, supra note 2, at 522–23, 526. 
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rule wall that may decrease economies of scope, diversification of risks, 
and perhaps even global competitiveness. Perhaps doing something must 
wait for a better understanding of systemic risk and excessive risk-taking 
with respect to today’s financial innovation and instruments. Once there, 
the Article posits that there must be some balancing of the synergies and 
global economic advantages created from the blending and systemic risk 
concerns. The Dodd-Frank Act requires more transparency and disclosures 
of systemically significant entities.25 However, it also simultaneously 
erects the Volcker rule wall between commercial banking and investment 
banking.26 The response to the recent recession must be nuanced. With 
more transparency comes more information to decide whether there 
should be a wall. It is important to consider that there may be a hefty cost 
to erecting the wall. 
I. BACKGROUND: SYSTEMIC RISK AND DODD-FRANK’S VOLCKER RULE 
A. Systemic Risk 
There is no widely accepted uniform definition of systemic risk.27 One 
way to define systemic risk is that it is the risk of collapse of an entire finan-
cial system or market “serious enough to quite probably have significant 
adverse effects on the real economy.”28 The “real economy” simply refers 
to the goods, services, and resources aspects of the economy as opposed to 
financial markets.29 
                                                 
25 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 404, 124 Stat. 1376, 1571–74 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4 (2012)). 
26 § 619, 124 Stat. at 1620–21. 
27 See Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an 
Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1353 (2011) (recognizing “that 
the term ‘systemic risk’ has been used in various ways, sometimes inconsistently”); Steven 
L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 247–48 (2008). Alan Greenspan stated that 
the “very definition [of systemic risk] is still somewhat unsettled.” George G. Kaufman, 
Bank Failures, Systemic Risk, and Bank Regulation, 16 CATO J. 17, 20–21 n.5 (1996) 
(quoting Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks 
at a Research Conference on Risk Measurement and Systemic Risk (Nov. 16, 1995)). 
28 The G10 Report on Consolidation in the Financial Sector, at 126 (Jan. 2001), 
http://www.bis.org/publ/gten05.pdf; see also George G. Kaufman & Kenneth E. Scott, 
What Is Systemic Risk, and Do Bank Regulators Retard or Contribute to It?, 7 THE 
INDEP. REV. 371, 371 (2003) (stating that “[s]ystemic risk refers to the risk or probability 
of breakdowns in an entire system, as opposed to breakdowns in individual parts or 
components, and is evidenced by comovements (correlation) among most or all the 
parts”) (emphasis omitted). 
29 Real Economy Definition, FIN. TIMES LEXICON, http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term 
=real-economy (last visited Feb. 2, 2013). 
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Bank lending affects the real economy.30 Banking entities are unique 
with respect to their place in our financial system. An expansion of bank 
deposits results in an increase of the money circulating in an economy.31 
This is because when a bank receives a deposit, the bank may keep a por-
tion of that deposit as reserves and loan out the rest. The borrower of that 
loan may deposit that borrowed money into a bank that keeps a portion of 
that deposit and loans out the rest. Therefore, changes in bank deposits 
change the amount of outstanding credit and the money supply. This con-
cept is known as the credit multiplier.32 In this way, banking entities play a 
special role in the stability of the U.S. financial system and that is typically 
the reason given for why they have access to certain governmental subsidies 
like Federal Reserve credit, federal insurance, and emergency services.33 
Systemic risk involves a potential cascading failure in a system or mar-
ket due to interlinkages and interdependencies.34 The chain reaction that is 
                                                 
30 Adam B. Ashcraft, Are Banks Really Special? New Evidence from the FDIC-Induced 
Failure of Healthy Banks, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1712, 1728 (2005) (“This paper has devel-
oped evidence that healthy-bank failures have significant and apparently permanent effects 
on real economic activity. While there are important caveats to keep in mind concerning 
the interpretation of pro forma failed bank balance sheets, much of this effect can be 
explained by a severe contraction of bank lending.”); KAMBHU, SCHUERMANN & STIROH, 
supra note 14, at 10. 
31 The concept is the credit multiplier. 
[It] magnifies small changes in bank deposits into changes in the amount 
of outstanding credit and the money supply. For example, a bank receives 
a deposit of $100,000, and the Reserve Requirement is 20%. The bank 
is thus required to keep $20,000 in the form of reserves. The remaining 
$80,000 becomes a loan, which is deposited in the borrower’s bank. 
When the borrower’s bank sets aside the $16,000 required reserve out 
of the $80,000, $64,000 is available for another loan and another de-
posit, and so on. Carried out to its theoretical limit, the original deposit 
of $100,000 could expand into a total of $500,000 in deposits and 
$400,000 in credit. 
JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN E. GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 
(8th ed. 2010). Example from BARBARA CASU ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO BANKING (2006). 
32 CASU, supra note 31. 
33 See Paul Volcker, Commentary on the Restrictions on Proprietary Trading by Insured 
Depositary Institutions 1, available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents 
/Volcker_Rule_Essay_2-13-12.pdf (stating that proprietary trading “does not justify the 
taxpayer subsidy implicit in routine access to Federal Reserve credit, deposit insurance or 
emergency support”). 
34 Regulatory Restructuring: Balancing the Independence of the Federal Reserve in 
Monetary Policy with Systemic Risk Regulation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic 
Monetary Policy and Tech. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 88 (2009) (testi-
mony of John Taylor) (“[S]ystemic risk in the financial sector [is] a risk that impacts the 
entire financial system and real economy, through cascading, contagion, and chain-reaction 
effects.”); see also Schwarcz, supra note 27, at 200. 
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often looked at is a banking panic.35 Banking panics historically have oc-
curred when customers withdrew their deposits from a bank in fear that 
the bank would become insolvent, causing a chain reaction of runs on other 
banks.36 The chain reaction may have occurred because other banks were 
owed money by the bank in trouble or simply because fear spread across 
the general populous.37 It is thought that much of the Great Depression’s 
economic damage was caused by bank runs.38 Some scholars contend that the 
recent economic crisis of 2007–2010 was a run by investors, not on banks, 
but on the shadow banking system.39 The term “shadow banking system” 
refers to the fact that financial institutions outside the traditional banking 
system, such as hedge funds and investment banks, have acted as interme-
diaries between investors and borrowers, and increasingly undertaken roles 
traditionally played by banks, including lending capital to U.S. businesses.40 
These intermediaries have included investment banks, hedge funds, and 
others that have expanded the liquidity in many global financial markets.41 
Many think of very large institutions when they think of systemic sig-
nificance. However, systemic risk does not only stem from being “too big 
                                                 
35 See generally George G. Kaufman, Banking and Currency Crisis and Systemic 
Risk: Lessons from Recent Events, 24 ECON. PERSPECTIVES, FED. RESERVE BANK OF CHI., 
no. 3, at 9–11 (2000) (discussing banking crises). 
36 Gary Gorton, Banking Panics and Business Cycles¸ 40 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 751, 
751–54 (1988); Rajkamal Iyer & Manju Puri, Understanding Bank Runs: The Importance 
of Depositor-Bank Relationships and Networks 2, 9 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 14280, 2008), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w14280. 
37 Gorton, supra note 36, at 751–55. 
38 Ben S. Bernanke, Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation 
of the Great Depression, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 257, 259–60 (1983). 
39 See Gary Gorton, Questions and Answers About the Financial Crisis Prepared for 
the U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2 (Feb. 20, 2010), available at http://online 
.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/crisisqa0210.pdf. 
40 Andrew W. Lo, Hedge Funds, Systemic Risk, and the Financial Crisis of 2007–
2008: Written Testimony for the House Oversight Committee Hearing on Hedge Funds 4 
(Nov. 13, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1301217. In the lending context, 
this role may consist of being an intermediary between investors and borrowers (i.e., 
funneling funds from the investor to the borrower). See id. The non-bank institution will 
thereby profit from fees and/or the difference in interest rates that it pays the investors 
and what it receives from the borrowers. This role may also consist of purchasing debt 
securities on the secondary market. These non-bank institutions may include hedge funds, 
investment banks, structured investment vehicles, and other non-bank entities. Id. 
41 Id. (describing financial intermediaries); see also Roger Ferguson & David Laster, 
Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk, FIN. STABILITY REV., Apr. 2007, at 45, 47–48, available at 
http://www.banque-france.fr/fileadmin/user_upload/banque_de_france/publications/Revue_de 
_la_stabilite_financiere/etud5_0407.pdf (explaining that hedge funds have contributed to 
market efficiency and financial stability by expanding liquidity and thereby lowering the 
cost of capital). 
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to fail” in terms of market share.42 The Dodd-Frank Act recently created the 
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), in part to identify, monitor, 
and respond to risks to the financial stability of the United States.43 In desig-
nating certain “nonbank” financial companies to be supervised by the Federal 
Reserve’s board of governors, some characteristics that were considered were 
“the extent and nature of the transactions and relationships of the company 
with other significant nonbank financial companies and significant bank hold-
ing companies;”44 “the importance of the company as a source of credit ... 
and as a source of liquidity for the United States financial system;”45 and the 
“interconnectedness ... of the company.”46 Clearly, Congress felt that there 
were factors in determining systemic risk that needed to be looked at in 
addition to the size and scale of the activities of the company.47 The Inter-
national Monetary Fund also determined, in a recent G-20 commissioned 
study, that institutions that were interconnected, not just the largest institu-
tions, could impair financial markets.48 Professor Hal Scott stated in his tes-
timony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs on the Volcker rule that “the absolute size of an institution is not 
the predicate for systemic risk; it is rather the size of its debt, its deriva-
tives positions, and the scope and complexity of many other financial rela-
tionships running between the firm, other institutions, and the wider financial 
system.”49 Therefore, while we certainly need more study on what actually 
causes systemic risk or a cascading failure, systemic risk in general can be 
thought of as a cascading failure, like dominoes, that affects the real economy. 
                                                 
42 See, e.g., Rivière, supra note 14, at 293 (“Indeed, the failure of LTCM, a hedge fund 
worth $4 billion, posed a systemic risk because of its exposure to banks. On the other 
hand, the failure of Amaranth, which was worth more than double that of LTCM ($9.5 
billion), had no systemic impact.” (citing Rama Cont, Amal Moussa & Andreea Minca, Too 
Interconnected to Fail: Contagion and Systemic Risk in Financial Networks (Columbia 
Ctr. for Fin. Eng’g, Working Paper, 2009))). 
43 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§§ 111–112, 124 Stat. 1376, 1392–95 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5321 (2012)). 
44 § 113(a)(2)(C), 124 Stat. at 1398. 
45 § 113(a)(2)(D), 124 Stat. at 1398. 
46 § 113(a)(2)(G), 124 Stat. at 1398. 
47 This is evidenced by the multi-faceted approach to defining “nonbank financial com-
panies” that will be supervised and regulated by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. 
See § 102(a)(1)(4)(A)–(D), § 113, 124 Stat. at 1391–92, 1398–99. 
48 See Staff of the Int’l Monetary Fund & the Bank for Int’l Settlements, & the Secretariat 
of the Fin. Stability Board, Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance of Financial 
Institutions, Markets and Instruments: Initial Considerations, Report to the G-20 Finance 
Ministers and Central Bank Governors, at 9 (Oct. 2009), http://www.imf.org/external/np 
/g20/pdf/100109.pdf. 
49 Implications of the “Volcker Rules” for Financial Stability: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 51 (2010) (statement of Hal Scott, 
Nomura Professor of International Systems, Harvard Law School). 
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B. Dodd-Frank’s Volcker Rule 
The Volcker rule, in section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act, generally re-
stricts “banking entities”50 from engaging in proprietary trading for the 
entity’s own account. This includes trading in any security, derivative, fu-
ture, option, or any other security or financial instrument designated by the 
federal banking agencies, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), and 
the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC).51 “Trading” gener-
ally means acquiring or taking positions “principally for the purpose of sell-
ing in the near term ....”52 However, “instruments held for investment, as 
opposed to trading,” are not banned.53 
Notwithstanding the general prohibitions of the Volcker rule, there are 
significant exemptions. These “permitted activities” include transactions in 
U.S. government or agency obligations, certain market-making activities, 
certain risk-mitigating hedging activities, and certain transactions in secu-
rities and other instruments on behalf of customers.54 There are also other 
exemptions for regulated insurance companies and offshore transactions.55 
The Volcker rule also prohibits banking entities from acquiring or retain-
ing certain ownership interests in, or sponsoring,56 a hedge fund or private 
                                                 
50 See supra note 12. 
51 § 619, 124 Stat. at 1620–21, 1630. “It does not apply to commodities such as pre-
cious or base metals, or energy or agricultural products, nor does it apply to foreign exchange 
or loans.” Understanding the New Financial Reform Legislation, supra note 12, at 66. 
52 § 619, 124 Stat. at 1630. 
53 Understanding the New Financial Reform Legislation, supra note 12, at 66. 
54 § 619, 124 Stat. at 1624. 
55 For example, the Dodd-Frank Act exempts from the proprietary trading ban certain 
transactions in securities and other financial instruments by a regulated insurance com-
pany, or its affiliate. Id. at 1623–24. 
The Dodd-Frank Act also exempts proprietary trading conducted by a 
banking entity pursuant to Section 4(c)(9) or 4(c)(13) of the Bank 
Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1841, but only if the trading occurs 
“solely outside of the United States” and the banking entity is not 
directly or indirectly owned or controlled by a banking entity organized 
under US or state law. 
Understanding the New Financial Reform Legislation, supra note 12, at 67 (citing Dodd-
Frank Act, § 619, 124 Stat. at 1625–26). Another exemption permits a banking entity to 
make “[i]nvestments in ... small business investment companies,” certain “investments 
designed primarily to promote the public welfare,” and “investments that are qualified 
rehabilitation expenditures [related] to a qualified rehabilitated building or certified 
historic structure.” § 619, 124 Stat. at 1624. 
56 A banking entity “sponsors” a covered fund by: 
(A) [serving] as a general partner, managing member, or trustee of [the] 
fund; 
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equity fund.57 There are several exemptions from these restrictions as well. 
A banking entity can organize and offer a fund, and be its general partner 
or managing member if the banking entity provides investment advisory or 
other services, if the fund is organized in connection with those services 
and if the fund is offered only to customers of the banking entity.58 In ad-
dition, the banking entity may only have a de minimis investment59 in the 
fund, the banking entity may not enter into certain transactions with the 
fund, and the banking entity may not guarantee or insure the obligations or 
performance of a private fund.60 The banking entity also may not share a 
name with the fund, and “no director or employee of a banking entity [may 
have] ... an interest in a private fund, except for any director or employee 
who is directly engaged in providing advisory services.”61 Finally, adequate 
                                                                                                                         
(B) ... select[ing] or ... control[ling] (or [having] employees, officers, or 
directors, or agents who constitute) a majority of the directors, trustees, 
or management of the fund; or 
(C) [sharing] with the fund, for corporate, marketing, promotional, or 
other purposes, the same name or a variation of the same name. 
§ 619, 124 Stat. at 1630. 
57 Covered funds include the following: 
The ban on certain relationships with “hedge funds” and “private equity 
funds” applies to any fund that relies on either Section 3(c)(1) (the ex-
emption for funds with less than 100 US beneficial owners) or 3(c)(7) 
(the exemption for funds with owners who meet the definition of “quali-
fied purchasers,” principally institutions and individuals with large in-
vestment portfolios) of the ICA for its exemption from registration under 
that Act, and similar funds as are designated by the agencies. Private funds 
not ordinarily considered to be the market equivalent of hedge funds or 
private equity funds, but which rely on either 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7), could be 
covered. For example, the ban may apply to collateralized debt obliga-
tions or other bank loan funds and securitization special purpose entities 
that rely on these exemptions, although the Dodd-Frank Act includes 
what appears to be a blanket exception for a banking entity’s sale or se-
curitization of loans “in a manner otherwise permitted by law.” 
Understanding the New Financial Reform Legislation, supra note 12, at 68. 
58 § 619(d)(1)(G)(ii), 124 Stat. at 1624–25. 
59 § 619(d)(1)(G)(iii), 124 Stat. at 1626. The de minimis investment provision permits 
a banking entity to make investments in covered funds under the fiduciary exemption for 
purposes of either “(i) establishing the fund and providing the fund with sufficient initial 
equity for investment to permit the fund to attract unaffiliated investors; or (ii) making a 
de minimis investment.” § 619, 124 Stat. at 1626–27. “A banking entity’s aggregate in-
vestment in all covered funds made pursuant to the de minimis investment authority must 
‘be immaterial to the banking entity,’ a term to be defined by rule, and in any case may not 
exceed” certain limits. Understanding the New Financial Reform Legislation, supra note 12, 
at 70. There are separate restrictions with respect to seed funding investments. See id. 
60 § 619(d)(1)(G)(v), 124 Stat. at 1625. 
61 Understanding the New Financial Reform Legislation, supra note 12, at 69. 
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disclosures must be provided in the offering documents stating “that the 
losses in a private fund are not borne by the banking entity.”62 
It is also important to note that the SEC and the CFTC may also exempt 
additional activities if they determine doing so “would promote and pro-
tect the safety and soundness of the banking entity and the financial stabil-
ity of the United States.”63 In addition, the exemptions from the Volcker 
rule proprietary trading ban and private fund restrictions will not apply if 
the transaction would involve a material conflict of interest or pose a 
threat to the safety and soundness of the banking entity or the financial 
stability of the United States.64 
Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the FSOC was to complete a study and 
make implementation recommendations so as to, among other things, “reduce 
conflicts of interest” and “limit activities that cause undue risk.”65 It did so 
in January 2011.66 Further, the SEC and the CFTC were required to consider 
the study and adopt rules with respect to the Volcker Rule within nine months 
of the completion of the FSOC’s study.67 The Federal Reserve Board (FRB), 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC), and the SEC approved proposed rules in October 2011 
and requested public comments that were due in February 2012.68 
The Volcker rule prohibitions would take effect on the earlier of twelve 
months after the date of issuance of final rules, or two years after the date 
of the Dodd-Frank Act’s enactment, July 21, 2012.69 Therefore, banking en-
tities and nonbank financial companies that are supervised by the FRB gen-
erally will have two years after the effective date, until July 21, 2014, to 
comply with the Volcker rule70 As this is being written, the OCC has stated 
                                                 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 71. 
64 Id. at 71. 
65 Id. at 72. 
66 FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, STUDY & RECOMMENDATIONS ON PROHIBITIONS 
ON PROPRIETARY TRADING & CERTAIN RELATIONSHIPS WITH HEDGE FUNDS & PRIVATE 
EQUITY FUNDS (2011), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/documents/volcker%20sec%20 
%20619%20study%20final%201%2018%2011%20rg.pdf. 
67 Understanding the New Financial Reform Legislation, supra note 12, at 69. 
68 See Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, 
and Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,846 (pro-
posed Nov. 7, 1011), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-11-07/pdf/2011-27184.pdf. 
The Commodities Futures Trading Commissions (CFTC) subsequently issued its own pro-
posed rules. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 77 Fed. Reg. 8332 (Feb. 14, 2012), http:// 
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-02-14/pdf/2012-935.pdf. 
69 § 619, 124 Stat. at 1622–23. 
70 Understanding the New Financial Reform Legislation, supra note 12, at 73; see 
Conformance Period for Entities Engaged in Prohibited Proprietary Trading or Private Equity 
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that “many of the largest national banks and their holding affiliates have 
shut down, or are in the process of winding down, exposures in trading 
books that appear most clearly to fall within the statutory definition of 
proprietary trading.”71 
C. Policies Behind the Enactment of the Volcker Rule 
One of the underlying policy considerations of the Volcker rule is that 
banking entities are different from other entities with respect to their place 
in our financial system.72 The monetary function of bank deposits is one of 
the main reasons why deposit-taking institutions are subject to heavier regu-
lation than non-deposit-taking institutions.73 The idea is that banking enti-
ties play a special role in the stability of the U.S. financial system and that is 
the reason why they have access to certain governmental subsidies like Federal 
Reserve credit, Federal Deposit Insurance, and emergency services.74 Pro-
ponents of the Volcker rule argue that banking entities should therefore be 
prohibited from engaging in activities that are deemed too risky.75 
The implicit contention behind these restrictions with respect to the pol-
icy justification of systemic risk is that proprietary trading for the banking 
entity’s own account is too risky because it could cause the banking entity to 
fail or reduce the liquidity it provides to others, disrupting credit channels.76 
                                                                                                                         
Fund or Hedge Fund Activities, 76 Fed. Reg. 8265 (Feb. 14, 2011) (to be codified at 12 
C.F.R. pt. 225). 
71 Letter from Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency to Carolyn Maloney, 
U.S. Rep. for N.Y. 14th District (July 18, 2012), available at http://maloney.house.gov 
/sites/maloney.house.gov/files/documents/financial/20120718OCCResponseAR-M550U 
_20120718_161635.pdf. As reflected in public filings, institutions that are in this process 
of winding down such activities include Bank of America, Citibank, JPMorganChase, 
Morgan Stanley, PNC, and Wells Fargo; the OCC further states it cannot gauge the extent 
to which actions already taken fulfill the Volcker rule until there is a final rule adopted on 
the definition of proprietary trading. Id. 
72 Please note that another main policy consideration behind the Volcker rule is the 
elimination of the conflicts of interest created by generating in blending the business of 
commercial and investment banking. This Article will focus on the systemic risk issue 
and not potential conflicts of interest. 
73 See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text. 
74 Id. 
75 See Merkley & Levin, supra note 2, at 533; FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 
supra note 66, at 1. 
76 See KAMBHU, SCHUERMANN & STIROH, supra note 14, at 11–12 (postulating that 
collateralization of these exposures may not be enough to mitigate against this risk 
because collateral values may fall, while recognizing that banks’ current exposures are 
heavily collateralized and each bank has some interest in mitigating these risks). But see 
Rivière, supra note 14, at 36 (stating the failure of Amaranth “did not have a destabiliz-
ing effect because counterparties to these funds held sufficient collateral”). 
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Similarly, if a hedge fund or private equity fund struggles or fails, a banking 
entity with exposure to that fund may also fail themselves or reduce liquid-
ity they provide to others, further disrupting credit channels.77 In addition, 
the limitation on investing in or sponsoring a hedge fund or private equity 
fund ensures that banking entities cannot circumvent the proprietary trading 
ban; this eliminates incentives for banks to bail out funds that they sponsor 
or in which they have significantly invested.78 
In January 2009, the Group of Thirty, under the leadership of a com-
mittee chaired by Paul Volcker, issued a report on financial reform aimed 
at global financial stability and “intended to be useful to policymakers in 
all the countries whose financial systems [were] disrupted in [the global 
financial crisis starting in 2007].”79 The report states that market forces 
combined with responses to those forces have led to pressure for changes 
in the structure of financial systems.80 The report also states that the impli-
cation is that “at least the very large and complex banking organizations 
that ... carry the major responsibility for maintaining the financial infra-
structure will need to be held to more rigorous standards of prudential reg-
ulation and supervision, with new constraints on the type and scope of 
their risk-taking activities.”81 The Group’s first recommendation was that 
large systemically important banking institutions be limited in high risk 
proprietary activities or those that present serious conflicts of interest.82 
The Group also recommended that sponsorship and management of pri-
vate pools of capital be limited.83 
Although the Volcker rule did not appear in the House version of the 
legislation that passed the House in December 2009 or in the original Senate 
version, adoption of the rule was endorsed by President Obama as part of 
                                                 
77 See KAMBHU, SCHUERMANN & STIROH, supra note 14, at 13 (citing Hyun Song 
Shin, Risk and Liquidity in a System Context (BIS, Working Paper No. 212, 2006)). 
78 See FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 66, at 6. 
79 Group of Thirty Working Group on Financial Reform, Financial Reform: A Framework 
for Financial Stability, at 8 (2009), available at http://www.group30.org/rpt_03.shtml. 
The Group of Thirty, established in 1978, is a private, nonprofit, inter-
national body composed of very senior representatives of the private 
and public sectors and academia. It aims to deepen understanding of in-
ternational economic and financial issues, to explore the international 
repercussions of decisions taken in the public and private sectors, and to 
examine the choices available to market practitioners and policymakers. 
History of the Group, GROUP OF THIRTY, http://www.group30.org/about.shtml (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2013). 
80 Group of Thirty Working Group on Financial Reform, supra note 79, at 16. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 28. 
83 Id. 
2013]  SYSTEMIC RISK AND THE VOLCKER RULE 197 
the administrative reform plan in early 2010.84 The rule was included in 
the Senate bill in April 2010.85 At this point in the legislative process, the 
rule was not debated in the Senate and was largely unchanged, passing in 
May 2010.86 While a number of changes were made to the rule in the con-
ference process, guidance was not provided as to motivation and applica-
tion of the rule. In fact, many of the material details and definitions were 
left for the FSOC and the other federal banking agencies. 
Senators Jeff Merkley and Carl Levin, who introduced the rule in Con-
gress, wrote a policy essay published in 2011.87 They contend that deregu-
lation, taking down the Glass-Steagall wall, allowed banks to take risks 
that precipitated the 2007 financial crisis.88 This contention will be addressed 
in Part III. The bulk of their essay focuses on abuses by banks that created 
and marketed products to clients that were secretly designed to fail and the 
use of client trading information against the interests of those clients and 
others in the markets.89 Therefore, via the Volcker rule, they try to “restore 
the spirit of regulations that followed the Great Depression” (the Glass-
Steagall wall).90 Because it is the spirit of the Glass-Steagall wall that moti-
vated the Volcker rule, this Article will now turn to the history of banking 
regulation in general, focusing on the expansion of bank services that led 
to the Glass-Steagall wall, the factors that led to the deconstruction of the 
Glass-Steagall wall, and the erection of the Volcker wall. 
II. A HISTORICAL LOOK AT SYSTEMIC RISK AND BANKING LAWS 
IN THE U.S. 
A. Early Regulators of State Chartered Banks—The First and Second 
Banks of the U.S. 
Before 1791, the American banking system consisted mostly of unstable 
state chartered banks.91 Many state banks issued notes that were not backed 
                                                 
84 See Kevin Drawbaugh, White House Recommits to “Volcker Rule” Bank Trade Ban, 
REUTERS (Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE61L3UL20100224. 
85 See Merkley & Levin, supra note 2, at 535–36. 
86 See id. at 536–37. 
87 Id. at 515. 
88 See id. at 516. 
89 Id. at 523, 525. 
90 Id. at 516. 
91 This does not include the Bank of North America ratified in early 1781 but its charter 
was repealed in 1785 due to charges of favoritism of foreigners and unfair competition. 1 
JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM CHRISTOPHER 
COLUMBUS TO THE ROBBER BARONS (1492–1900), at 86–88 (2002) [hereinafter MARKHAM, 
FINANCIAL HISTORY]. 
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by specie—gold or silver—redeemable at the bank’s office.92 This meant 
each bank had its own currency, which caused interregional issues.93 In 
order to stabilize and improve the nation’s credit with respect to the debt 
from the Revolutionary War and to create a standard form of currency, the 
First Bank of the United States was chartered by Congress in 1791.94 It 
was responsible for twenty percent of the currency supply while state banks 
accounted for the rest.95 Restrictions on the bank stemmed from fears of 
concentrations of wealth in the hands of a few.96 The Bank of the United 
States was prohibited, for example, “from investing in land or buildings and 
from dealing in goods, wares, merchandise, or commodities.”97 
After Alexander Hamilton, the bank’s champion, left the position of 
Secretary of the Treasury, the new Secretary of the Treasury advised that the 
government could raise money by selling its shares in the bank.98 Congress 
agreed and the bank’s charter was allowed to expire in 1811.99 Competing 
private banks resented the Bank of the United States and were able to pre-
vent its charter renewal by the Congress in 1811.100 
The debt of the nation from the War of 1812 led to an increase in state 
banks’ notes and inflation skyrocketed because most state chartered banks 
suspended specie payments.101 As a result, Congress agreed to form the Se-
cond Bank of the United States in 1816.102 The Second Bank of the United 
States served as an early regulator of the wildcat banks, in that it held large 
quantities of other banks’ notes in reserve and could discipline banks that 
it was concerned were over-issuing notes with the threat of redeeming those 
                                                 
92 Id. at 168. 
93 Id. at 168–69. 
94 Id. at 75. A central banking system was quite controversial to some of the founding 
fathers. England had tried to place the colonies under the control of the Bank of England 
prior to the Revolutionary War. Some founding fathers were in favor of a central bank. 
95 Id. at 88–89; The First Bank of the United States (1791–1811), AMERICAN HISTORY: 
FROM THE REVOLUTION TO RECONSTRUCTION AND BEYOND, http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/essays 
/general/a-brief-history-of-central-banking/the-first-bank-of-the-united-states-(1791-1811) 
.php (last visited Feb. 2, 2013). 
96 Jerry W. Markham, The Subprime Crisis—A Test Match for the Bankers: Glass-Steagall 
vs. Gramm-Leach-Bliley, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1081, 1082 (2010) [hereinafter Markham, The 
Subprime Crisis]. 
97 Id. at 1083. 
98 First Bank of the United States, http://www.saylor.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2011 
/08/HIST312-5.1.3-First-Bank-of-the-United-States.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2013). 
99 Id. 
100 Markham, The Subprime Crisis, supra note 96, at 1083. 
101 See Second Bank of the United States/Portrait Gallery, U.S. HISTORY, http://www 
.ushistory.org/tour/second-bank.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2013). 
102 Id. 
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notes.103 Andrew Jackson feared that a powerful private institution would 
be susceptible to corruption and refused to renew the bank’s charter in 1832, 
pulling federal deposits from the bank.104 The bank was crippled and its 
federal charter expired in 1836.105 Also in 1836, President Jackson declared 
in the Specie Circular (Coinage Act) by executive order that the government 
would only accept gold or silver for payment of land, which caused runs on 
the banks and a wave of bank failures.106 
B. Informal Regulation—The Free Banking Era 
The period from 1837 to the Civil War was known as the free banking 
era since there was no central bank and states controlled their own bank 
charters.107 Banks could generally enter into the banking business by depos-
iting government bonds with state auditors.108 The government bonds were 
the collateral that backed their bank notes.109 In addition, banks were gener-
ally required to redeem their notes on demand in specie.110 While there was 
no central bank, the Suffolk Bank played this role to a certain extent with 
respect to disciplining banks that were issuing too many notes, clearing pay-
ments, and exchanging notes. Also in 1853, the New York Clearinghouse 
Association was established and provided a way for banks to exchange notes 
and checks and settle accounts.111 Many contend that this kind of free bank-
ing is instable and cite bank failures in Indiana, Wisconsin, and Minnesota 
during this era as evidence.112 
                                                 
103 Markham, The Subprime Crisis, supra note 96, at 1084. 
104 See MARKHAM, FINANCIAL HISTORY, supra note 91, at 144. 
105 Id. at 146 (discussing how the Second Bank “failed in its effort to obtain a federal 
charter” but “was able to carry on its banking activities ... through a charter granted by 
Pennsylvania”). See generally Edwin J. Perkins, Lost Opportunities for Compromise in the 
Bank War: A Reassessment of Jackson’s Veto Message, 61 BUS. HIST. REV. 531 (1987). 
106 See MARKHAM, FINANCIAL HISTORY, supra note 91, at 148. 
107 See MARKHAM, FINANCIAL HISTORY, supra note 91, at 170 (discussing specific ex-
amples of state regulation of bank charters during this period); see also Arthur J. Rolnick & 
Warren E. Weber, New Evidence on the Free Banking Era, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 1080, 1080 
(1983) (describing the lack of regulation during this period and the attendant problems as 
“often cited as evidence that banking should be regulated”). 
108 See Hugh Rockoff, The Free Banking Era: A Reexamination, 6 J. MONEY, CREDIT 
& BANKING 141, 141 (1974). 
109 See id.; Rolnick & Weber, supra note 107, at 1083. 
110 Rolnick & Weber, supra note 107, at 1083. 
111 A History of Central Banking in the United States, THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK 
OF MINNEAPOLIS, http://www.minneapolisfed.org/community_education/student/central 
bankhistory/bank.cfm (last visited Feb. 2, 2013). See id. at 177. 
112 Rolnick & Weber, supra note 107, at 1084. Kam Hon Chu, Is Free Banking More Prone 
to Bank Failures Than Regulated Banking?, 16 CATO J., no. 1, Spring/Summer 1995, at 48. 
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C. The National Banking System, Federal Reserve Act and Stock Market 
Crash of 1929 
The Civil War led to a “dual” banking system in which a bank could 
adopt a state charter, which would be regulated by state regulators, or a na-
tional charter, which would be regulated by the OCC.113 State banks could 
not issue their own notes that could serve as a circulating currency.114 
With the need to finance the Civil War and multiple currencies in the 
form of state bank notes circulating, interest in a National Bank was re-
newed.115 The original National Banking Act of 1863116 was enacted with 
the main goal of creating a single national currency.117 It created national 
banks that were able to issue United States Treasury backed bank notes, 
which were printed by the government itself.118 
The number of bank notes allowed to be issued was contingent upon 
the bank’s capital level deposited with the Comptroller of the Currency. To 
further regulate currency, the Act also placed a tax on notes issued by state 
and local banks, which effectively drove non-federally issued notes out of cir-
culation.119 The National Banking Act of 1864 replaced the National Banking 
Act of 1863.120 The new Act also established federally issued bank charters.121 
The new federal chartering took banking regulation and authority away from 
corrupt state governments.122 Under the National Banking Act of 1864, a 
national bank’s role was to invest its funds in short-term, self-liquidating 
loans to finance goods in the process of production or exchange.123 How-
ever, national banks had difficulty conducting such limited operations and 
surviving because they had to compete with state-chartered banks and trust 
companies.124 They therefore took advantage of what some call a “loophole” 
in the law that permitted these banks to perform activities “incidental” but 
                                                 
113 Markham, The Subprime Crisis, supra note 96, at 1084 (citations omitted). 
114 Id. 
115 See Richard S. Grossman, U.S. Banking History, Civil War to World War II, EH.NET 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS HISTORY (Feb. 2, 2010, 6:21 PM), http://eh 
.net/encyclopedia/article/grossman.banking.history.us.civil.war.wwii. 
116 National Banking Act of 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665. 
117 Grossman, supra note 115. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 National Banking Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99. 
121 See Grossman, supra note 115. 
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necessary to their operations.125 Courts broadly interpreted this to mean the 
national banks could do what was not specifically prohibited by law.126 
The national banking system suffered from many bank panics, notably 
in 1873, 1893, and 1907.127 These panics included a large number of de-
positors attempting to get their money, causing an otherwise solvent bank 
to fail.128 Depositors at other banks would then follow suit, causing the 
panic to be system-wide.129 After a bad panic in 1907, the nation again be-
gan to consider a central bank.130 The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 created 
twelve private regional federal reserve banks and a Federal Reserve Board 
appointed by the President.131 It also created a single new United States 
currency.132 All nationally chartered banks were required to become mem-
bers and to purchase specified non-transferable stock in their regional fed-
eral reserve bank.133 They were also required to set aside a stipulated amount 
of noninterest-bearing reserves with their respective reserve bank.134 
D. The Rise of Commercial Banks Engaging in Investment Banking 
In order to compete with state chartered banks, national commercial banks 
started to supply trust services to their customers, through affiliates.135 World 
War I financing needs required many national banks to handle their first se-
curity issues in the form of bonds.136 In addition to the financing needs of 
World War I, there was a decline for commercial loans, which left the banks 
looking for new income.137 Once banks entered the securities business, they 
found commercial banking and investment banking to be complementary. 
Commercial banks had large numbers of customers to tap into for the pur-
chase of the securities, so they were able to charge smaller commissions than 
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investment bankers who had a smaller client base.138 Because of the banks’ 
distribution networks, they could obtain desirable participations in under-
writing syndicates.139 Banks could also use existing parent banks’ offices 
to sell the securities.140 In return, banks could take advantage of securities 
research staffs to analyze both purchases for the bank, and collateral.141 
Given these advantages and the limited role prescribed for national banks 
in the National Banking Act of 1864, national banks began using affiliated 
trust companies to engage in securities businesses.142 For example, National 
City Company, an “investment affiliate” of National City Bank, was orga-
nized in 1911.143 National City Bank’s officers and shareholders owned, via 
trustees, all of the stock of the company in proportion to their ownership 
interest in the National City Bank.144 This beneficial interest in the invest-
ment company was tied to the shares of the bank, in that sale of bank stock 
included the corresponding shares of the beneficial interest in the invest-
ment company.145 This was evidenced by a stamp on the back of the bank 
shares stating that the beneficial interest in the company went with the 
bank shares.146 Other banks carried an affiliate as an investment of the bank, 
or a holding company owned both the investment affiliate and the bank.147 
The investment banking done by affiliates of commercial banks grew. 
From 1927 to 1930, the level of participation in all bond issues by banks and 
banks’ affiliates increased from 36.8 percent to 61.8 percent.148 National 
City Company, for example, an affiliate of National City Bank, was not sub-
ject to the limitations of National City Bank and could therefore engage in 
any lawful business, including investing in shares of sixteen banks and trust 
companies and other businesses. 
In 1911, U.S. Solicitor General Fredrick W. Lehman considered whether 
National City Bank’s affiliation with National City Company violated banking 
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laws. Lehman concluded that National City Company’s investments in six-
teen banks and trust companies caused concern that it was gaining control 
over banks. He thus found that National City’s holding of bank stock did 
violate federal banking laws.149 National City Company did not respond to 
the ruling and ultimately, President William Taft asked to handle the matter 
but did not pursue it.150 A congressional subcommittee, the Pujo Committee, 
was formed two years later in 1913 to investigate Wall Street bankers and 
criticism of securities affiliates was reignited.151 Although the committee it-
self garnered press, there was no resulting legislation.152 
E. Erecting the Glass-Steagall Wall 
Yet another investigation, the Pecora Investigation, was initiated almost 
twenty years later, on March 4, 1932, by the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Banking and Currency to investigate the causes of the 1929 stock market 
crash.153 On October 24, 1929, “Black Thursday,” the stock market lost 
around nine percent of its value by the end of the day.154 Several bankers, 
including Charles E. Mitchell,155 then president of the National City Bank of 
New York, used their financial resources to bid on large blocks of blue chip 
stocks at prices above the current market in an effort to halt the slide.156 It 
worked temporarily, but by October 29, 1929, “Black Tuesday,” the Dow had 
lost twelve percent more.157 Some sources say that in total, “$25 billion—
some $319 billion in today’s dollars—was lost in the 1929 crash.”158 In ad-
dition, the market would not return to its pre-crash statistics until 1954.159 
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Among other abuses, in its report the Pecora commission discussed 
“abuses arising out of the interrelationship of commercial and investment 
banking.”160 The commission discussed investment banks that were affili-
ated with large commercial banks as a “prolific source of evil.”161 The report 
states that these affiliates were instrumentalities employed “to speculate in 
their own stock, to participate in market operations designed to manipulate 
the price of securities, and to conduct other operations in which commercial 
banks are forbidden by law to engage.”162 For example, the report goes on to 
detail National City Bank’s creation of its investment affiliate, National City 
Company. According to the report, the purpose of National City Company 
was to allow National City Bank “to make investments not within the scope 
of the bank’s power.”163 One historian called the independence of City’s in-
vestment bank, National City Company, “a masterpiece of legal humor.”164 
The report further concluded that commercial banks breached fiduciary duties 
to depositors who sought “disinterested investment counsel” because com-
mercial banks referred them to their affiliates.165 
The commission questioned Charles E. Mitchell, who was elected presi-
dent of National City Bank in 1921 and chairman in 1929, for losses con-
cerning potential conflicts of interest of the intersection between commercial 
banking and investment banking, excessive pay, and tax avoidance.166 Senator 
Glass said of him: “Mitchell more than any 50 men is responsible for this stock 
crash.”167 These hearings mostly identified problems with respect to conflicts 
of interest in blending commercial banking and investment banking and did 
not focus on systemic risk.168 
F. Deregulation: Gramm-Leach-Blilely 
In the 1960s, banks began looking for new sources of income to com-
pensate for inflation.169 The then Comptroller of the Currency, James Saxon, 
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encouraged this by taking an expansive approach to the banking laws.170 He 
permitted commercial banks and affiliates to engage in an expanding list and 
volume of securities activities.171 Some of these activities were prohibited 
by the courts172 but by the time the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was enacted 
in 1999, many felt that the Glass-Steagall wall had already come down.173 
In 1998, a year before Gramm-Leach-Bliley tore down Glass-Steagall’s 
wall, Citicorp, a commercial bank holding company, merged with an insur-
ance company to form a corporation that combined banking, securities, and 
insurance services. This merger was technically a violation of the Glass-
Steagall Act and the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 but the Federal 
Reserve granted Citicorp a temporary waiver. Subsequently, Gramm-Leach 
Bliley was enacted, tearing down Glass-Steagall’s wall, removing the pro-
hibition of commercial banks from entering into securities and insurance 
businesses.174 The stated purpose of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was to 
“enhance competition in the financial services industry by providing a ... 
framework for the affiliation of banks, security firms, insurance companies, 
and other financial service providers.”175 
III. DOES THE BLENDING OF COMMERCIAL BANKING AND INVESTMENT 
BANKING PRODUCE THE ALLEGED HARM, INCREASED SYSTEMIC RISK? 
Does the blending of commercial banking and investment banking pro-
duce the alleged harm, increased systemic risk? It is important to reiterate 
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that justifications for prohibiting blending usually rely on two separate ra-
tionales. One is that certain conflicts of interest injure the public. The other 
is that the blending increases systemic risk. This Article will focus on the 
latter, systemic risk, leaving possible solutions to the issues of conflicts of 
interest for another discussion. 
A. The Great Depression 
First, consider the assertions that the blending played a significant role 
in the stock market crash of 1929 and subsequent banking crisis. Much of 
the blame for the banking crisis after 1929 was put on commercial banks’ 
investment banking activities through their bond departments and through 
affiliated securities firms.176 Hearings on the bill that would become the 
Banking Act of 1933 uncovered abuses in the activities of the security af-
filiates.177 Senator Glass stated: “[T]hese affiliates, I repeat, were the most 
unscrupulous contributors, next to the debauch of the New York Stock 
Exchange, to the financial catastrophe which visited this country and was 
mainly responsible for the depression under which we have been suffering 
since.”178 It is difficult to tease out the role that the investment banking 
activities of commercial banks played in the crisis of 1929. Nevertheless, 
while the congressional hearings generated buzz about the blending’s 
harm to the soundness of banks, most of the actual testimony in hearings 
convened in 1931 focused on the potential conflicts of interest in the 
blending as opposed to the potential for increased systemic risk.179 
It was also alleged that the blending may create liquidity issues for 
commercial banks because a bank would hold short-term demand deposits 
while being exposed to marketable securities with long-term maturities.180 
Securities, moreover, may have unanticipated losses because the market 
unexpectedly fluctuates. If the market turns down, a blended bank’s assets 
values (securities for its own account) may decrease at the same time that 
the depositors will withdraw their funds and borrowers would default on 
the loans. In addition, it was thought that a bank may make investment 
decisions it would not otherwise make but for the blending, such as lend-
ing money or purchasing from a securities affiliate or certain customers on 
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preferential terms.181 This too could affect a bank’s liquidity, making it 
more susceptible to panics and failure.182 
These theories have not necessarily been borne out by the statistics. 
Looking at four different liquidity measures to determine the potential in-
fluence of securities affiliates on commercial banks, Eugene White stated 
that national banks’ liquidity did not appear to have been weakened by the 
presence of an affiliated securities business.183 On the contrary, White 
found a “significantly higher survival rate of banks with securities opera-
tions during the massive bank failures of 1930–1933.”184 He stated that 
“[w]hile 26.3% of all national banks failed in this period, only 6.5% of the 
62 banks which had affiliates in 1929 and 7.6% of the 145 banks which 
conducted large operations through their bond departments closed their 
doors.”185 He does concede that this may be due to the size of these banks 
and their ability to achieve more diversification and economies of scale.186 
White also found, using data from 1931, the year when the largest number 
of banks with securities affiliates failed, that the presence of an affiliate 
appears to have reduced the probability of bank failure.187 Friedman and 
Schwartz argue that banks would have failed at a much faster rate if the insta-
bility was due to the assets they had accumulated in the 1920s (securities).188 
William Shughart found further evidence against the culpability of 
blending in that it was the smaller, rural institutions that did not have 
much blending that accounted for the majority of bank failures throughout 
the 1920s and early 1930s.189 In addressing the issue of whether the larger 
banks could have contributed to the collapse of the smaller banks in fun-
neling worthless investment securities to the smaller banks, he stated that a 
competing explanation should be considered.190 That potential competing 
explanation is that the smaller banks were hurt by the failing agricultural 
industry, highlighting that the default rate on agricultural loans was so 
high that many smaller banks would have failed anyway.191 In addition, 
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what about the argument that investment banking is too risky and might 
injure the banks? White found that while the securities affiliates’ return 
was subject to a high degree of risk (as evidenced by the mean and stand-
ard deviation being higher than for the banks), this does not seem to have 
generated wider fluctuations in the banks’ combined earnings.192 
Some authors even go so far as to suggest alternate explanations for 
the passage of the Glass-Steagall wall including the interests of investment 
banks in keeping commercial banks from their business, the interests of 
commercial banks in keeping investment banks from their business, and 
the interest of the U.S. Treasury in eliminating a competitor, private secu-
rities, for the purchase of the Treasury’s securities by banks.193 
B. Did the Blending Play a Critical Role in the Financial Crisis of 2007? 
Senators Merkley and Levin, the Volcker rule’s drafters, state in their 
policy essay that “[p]roprietary trading [including investments in separate pri-
vate funds managed or sponsored by the bank] played a critical role in the 
recent global financial crisis and subsequent recession.”194 They state that 
“the lessons of the Great Depression were forgotten over time” and that 
“deregulation enabled banks to take the risks that precipitated the current 
financial crisis.”195 They contend that the Glass-Steagall wall protected U.S. 
financial stability and that “similar to the Great Crash of 1929 ... proprietary 
trading losses had once again played a central role in bringing the financial 
system to its knees.”196 The Senators state that firms’ disclosed proprietary 
trading revenues and losses demonstrate that those losses were significant.197 
The Senators are not alone in blaming proprietary trading for financial 
instability. As mentioned above, two years earlier in January 2009, the 
Group of Thirty, under the leadership of a committee chaired by Paul 
Volcker, issued a report on financial reform aimed at global financial sta-
bility and “intended to be useful to policymakers in all the countries whose 
financial systems [were] disrupted in [the global financial crisis starting in 
2007].”198 The group’s first recommendation was that large systemically im-
portant banking institutions should be limited in their proprietary securities 
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trading activities that present particularly high risks and serious conflicts 
of interest.199 The group also recommended that sponsorship and man-
agement of private pools of capital be prohibited.200 While admitting that 
“there were many factors other than proprietary trading contributing to the 
breakdown of the financial markets,”201 Paul Volcker stated in his com-
mentary to the Volcker Rule that “losses within large trading positions 
were in fact a contributing factor for some of our most systemically im-
portant institutions.”202 
Were Senators Merkely and Levin correct when they contended that the 
blending of commercial banking and investment banking played a “critical 
role” in the crisis of 2007 by allowing banks to purchase and sell financial 
instruments for their own account, and by allowing banks to invest in pri-
vate funds managed or sponsored by the bank? In other words, was it the 
removal of the Glass-Steagall wall by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999 
that led to the financial crisis in 2007? This debate has been fought over the 
front page of newspapers. For example, a front-page New York Times article 
pointed out that the “Gramm-Leach-Blilely Act ... removed barriers ... that had 
been instituted to reduce the risk of economic catastrophes.”203 Phil Gramm 
responded instead, fingering faulty monetary policy and mortgage lending.204 
This Article posits that it has not been demonstrated that deregulation 
led to the financial crisis. In fact, deregulation, or the removal of the Glass-
Steagall wall, may have allowed banks to achieve diversification, liquidity, 
complementaries, and global competitiveness. But instead of looking at 
the underlying causes of the excessive risk taking, legislators want to ban 
proprietary trading altogether, and with it lose the potential benefits. This 
Article argues that we must look at some of the more nuanced causes of 
the financial crisis and not just throw the baby, the potential benefits of 
deregulation, out with the bathwater, excessive risk taking. 
Banks were in the business of mortgage-backed securities, which were 
blamed for much of the losses, well before the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act took 
down the Glass-Steagall wall. In 1987, the OCC made a determination that 
the Glass-Steagall Act did not prevent a national bank from selling mortgage-
backed securities and the Second Circuit upheld that determination.205 Part 
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of the Second Circuit’s reasoning was that it recognized that the increased 
liquidity provided by such business would help banks as they fund long-
term mortgage loans with short-term deposits.206 
In addition to mortgage-backed securities, subprime mortgage lending 
and excessive risk taking is seen as a culprit in the financial crisis.207 Sub-
prime lending is generally a loan to a borrower that is not creditworthy.208 
It was not the lack of a wall between commercial and investment banking 
that made it possible for banks to enter the subprime mortgage market. In 
fact, the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA) encouraged this 
kind of lending by making loaning to subprime areas a condition for re-
ceiving approval from bank regulators for bank mergers.209 These loans 
could be securitized, which meant banks had a way to move subprime 
loans off their balance sheets.210 Note that the CRA required that these 
loans be made consistent with safe and sound practices, but that there was 
clearly incentive for excessive risk taking with the promise of a CRA credit 
reward.211 Banks also failed to perform due diligence with respect to the 
creditworthiness of borrowers, perhaps on the mistaken belief that a rising 
housing market would allow for refinancing and avoid foreclosures.212 In 
addition to failing to perform due diligence, banks may have taken exces-
sive risks because of the failure of ratings agencies and risk assessment 
models to adequately capture the risks associated with certain modern fi-
nancial instruments, such as credit default swaps213 and securitized obliga-
tions.214 Additional factors that some authors say may have contributed to 
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the financial crisis include federal interest rate policies and mark-to-market 
accounting.215 The Glass-Steagall wall would not have prevented incentiviza-
tion for lenders to make subprime loans, failures in performing due diligence, 
and failures at measuring the credit risk of modern financial instruments. 
There are clearly issues with banks engaging in proprietary trading. 
Namely, as Senators Merkley and Levin point out, proprietary trading 
banks that trade may gather information from their banking clients and 
exploit it.216 This leads to a conflict of interest between the banks’ motiva-
tions and their clients’ motivations. The most egregious conflict of interest 
examples include designing products to fail, selling them to clients and 
then making trading bets on the products’ collapse.217 Proponents of the 
Volcker rule often focus on these conflict of interest rationales. If conflict 
of interest is the main harm we are trying to address, it may make more 
sense to consider other solutions such as additional disclosures and regula-
tions that protect the public from such conflicts. Therefore, with respect to 
the argument that proprietary trading by banks increases systemic risk, this 
Article concludes that this has not been demonstrated. It seems that we 
should look at the incentives for excessive risk such as the failure of risk 
ratings and models and skewed incentives for bad business judgment be-
fore taking the drastic step of banning proprietary trading altogether. 
CONCLUSION 
The claims that the Glass-Steagall Act and Volcker rule walls are 
needed to decrease systemic risk have not been supported. We need to 
study systemic risks by gaining a deeper understanding of the links be-
tween financial intermediation, money, and credit flows. We need to gain 
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a better understanding of excessive risk taking and the cause, incentives, 
and instrumentalities of such risk taking. The Glass-Steagall wall seemed 
to have been erected in 1933 to address conflicts of interest in the blending 
of commercial and investment banks and as a purported fix to the horrors 
of the Great Depression in the name of regulating systemic risk. White’s 
statistics demonstrate not only that the blending may not increase systemic 
risk, but that there may be diversification, complementaries, and econo-
mies of scope benefits to the blending. Further, the financial crisis of 2007 
was likely caused by failures in our financial system that reach beyond 
proprietary trading in general. If we are trying to correct potential conflicts 
of interest, why not regulate and require additional disclosures that protect 
the public from such conflicts of interest? If we are trying to reduce sys-
temic risk, why not study excessive risk taking in general and regulate 
more precisely instead of banning proprietary trading by banks and sys-
temically significant entities altogether? 
This Article posits that we need a better understanding of systemic risk 
before we erect a wall that may decrease economies of scope and comple-
mentaries of these businesses. Leaving the industry without the wall may 
in fact, because of diversification, make banks less susceptible to failure. 
More importantly, a wall may put U.S. banks at a global competitive dis-
advantage. This Article posits that in the legislative histories of both the 
Glass-Steagall and the Volcker rule, legislators focus on conflicts of interest 
issues that can be solved in other ways, such as additional disclosures and 
regulations without the cost to diversification, economies of scope, and 
global competition. At the very least, whether the blending increases sys-
temic risk needs more study. It seems that the Glass-Steagall wall and the 
Volcker rule wall have been more political than economic in satisfying 
public outcry to do something, anything, about the respective disasters. 
